Abstract-The intergenerational earnings mobility of Canadians born to immigrants is examined using the 2001 Census. A detailed portrait of the Canadian population is offered as are estimates of the degree of generational mobility among the children of immigrants from seventy countries. The degree of intergenerational persistence is about the same for immigrants as for the entire population, and there is more generational mobility among immigrants in Canada than in the United States. We also use quantile regressions to distinguish between the role of social capital from other constraints limiting mobility and find that these are present.
I. Introduction
T HE degree of generational mobility-the relationship between a child's adult labor market and social success and his or her family background-is an important aspect of how societies function. The extent to which children from impoverished backgrounds can realistically aspire to better themselves, or conversely the extent to which children from the highest strata can expect to inherit the same position as their parents, speaks to important social issues such as the long-term consequences of child poverty or more generally to equality of opportunity. Indeed, beliefs about generational income and social mobility inform the defining metaphors of some countries. This is a subject that has often been hotly debated among the broader public but also in academia, as witnessed, for example, in Scott and Leonhardt (2005) and Wessel (2005) as well as in a number of surveys and overviews (Björklund & Jäntti, 2000; Bowles, Gintis, & Osborne, 2005; Corak, 2004 Corak, , 2006 Solon, 1999 Solon, , 2002 .
But this is a topic that is also particularly relevant to immigrants and their integration into host countries. From the perspective of individuals and their families the sometimes very large costs of emigrating and settling in a new land are often shouldered because of the perceived benefits for the children. In this sense it is important to understand the long-run attainments of immigrant children. This issue is all the more pertinent since in some countries there are heightened concerns about the extent to which immigrants have been able to successfully integrate into the labor market.
The main objective of this paper is to provide evidence on intergenerational earnings mobility between first-and secondgeneration Canadians. Although there are estimates of intergenerational mobility for the Canadian population, the availability of new information on family background in the 2001 Canadian Census offers the opportunity to examine this issue for immigrants and their children. The large sample sizes in the Census also provide an opportunity to highlight a number of methodological issues raised in existing studies using a similar approach to estimating the correlation in the earnings and the educational attainments between parents and children. We also offer some results that permit a comparison between the degree of generational mobility among immigrants in Canada with those in the United States, two of the world's most important immigrant-receiving countries.
Canada may be a particularly interesting country to focus upon because it is looked at as a success story in terms of the extent to which immigrants integrate into society and the economy. The selection process relied upon in Canada is often cited as an aspect of this success. In fact, there have been substantial changes in immigration policy that have changed the way in which potential immigrants are chosen, and consequently the size and origins of the immigrant inflow. Canadian immigration policy until the early 1960s was based on national-origin quota system that limited immigration of certain national-origin groups while facilitating the entry of others. This system was replaced in 1962 with a policy emphasizing the skills of immigrants, which in turn led to the introduction of the point system in 1967.
The point system awards points to visa applicants who have particular socioeconomic characteristics-such as schooling, work experience, and English or French language skills-and then sets a "pass mark" that determines the subset of visa applicants who qualify. There were four major admission categories for immigrants who arrived in Canada between 1970 and 2000: (i) family class migrants, covering immediate family members; (ii) nominated relatives, covering close relatives; (iii) independent migrants, covering various subcategories of skilled workers as well as entrepreneurs and investors; and (iv) refugees. Those applying as nominated relatives or independent migrants are subject to the points test. The share of immigrants belonging to each of the categories has fluctuated significantly over time. In particular, the share of independent immigrants rose from 21% in 1984 to 59% in 2000 (Citizenship and Immigration, 2001) . 1 It should also be noted that an important consequence of abandoning the national-origin system was a large shift in immigration away from "traditional" source countries. About 65% of the 1965-1969 cohort of male immigrants were born in northern, western, or southern Europe and 13% in Asia. By contrast 54% of the 1995-1999 cohort were born in Asia and only 14% in northern, western, or southern Europe. Similar shifts in region of origin are also observed for women (Aydemir & Skuterud, 2005) .
Immigrants from the newer source regions earn less in the Canadian labor market than those from the traditional regions with similar characteristics. Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) , for example, document a marked deterioration in the earnings of successive cohorts of male immigrants to Canada, with the most recent cohorts earning as much as 50% to 60% less than their Canadian-born counterparts. They also report that immigrants from northern, western, and southern Europe have earnings that are higher or no more than 6% lower than observationally equivalent immigrants born in North America, while Asian immigrants have conditional earnings that are at least 10% lower. The increasing fraction of immigrants from newer regions and their lower earnings is part of the reason that successive immigrant cohorts to Canada witnessed significant deterioration in their entry earnings since 1960s.
The consequence of this is that in spite of the points system, low-income rates among recent immigrants are high and getting higher. In this context it is important to understand the intergenerational process determining the long-run outcomes of children. A good deal of generational mobility may imply that disadvantages in childhood will not echo into adulthood, while a lack of generational mobility would suggest that the consequences of low income in the present are even more costly as the next generation will grow up to be low-income adults. Most of the existing literature examines this relationship for the general population, with only a few studies addressing the issue for immigrants.
Our analysis begins in the next two sections with an overview of the analytical framework and a description of the data. The subsequent two sections present the major results, which are organized under three related themes. First, least squares estimates of standard regression to the mean models of generational earnings mobility suggest that the elasticity between father and son earnings is no different among immigrants and their children than among the Canadian population at large. In line with the broader literature, it is lower among Canadian immigrants than those in the United States. We also find that there does not seem to be any statistically significant relationship between father and daughter earnings, a result that is in contrast with the prevailing Canadian literature. Second, a simple decomposition of the generational elasticity suggests that it is, at least in the father-son case, driven by factors other than educational attainment. This is in part due to a low estimated return to education, but mostly because other channels are more important. Third, this result-the finding that other factors are important-leads us to more explicitly examine one possible channel often discussed in this literature, socalled social capital which is most often measured by the average characteristics of the community to which secondgeneration immigrants belong. Applying arguments from the literature on generational dynamics we use quantile regressions to distinguish the role of social capital from other broader societal constraints that may influence its value in the labor market. The results are consistent with a view that these constraints are present among the immigrant population. This suggests that a least squares analysis using the average characteristics of a group to denote or measure social capital, as is common in this literature, is not appropriate since it combines community characteristics with broader barriers in the host society, reflecting how these characteristics are valued. We also find that the education levels of fathers, not just income, are important in overcoming these barriers.
II. A Framework for the Analysis
Our empirical approach is motivated by the regression to the mean model of generational mobility used in much of economic analysis to measure mobility in earnings and income. This is depicted in equation (1), where Y represents an outcome of interest, in our case principally permanent income, and t is an index of generations.
To use the example of income, in this equation the adult income (in natural logarithms) of family i's child would be Y i,t , which is equal to the average adult income of the children of generation t, as represented by ␣, plus two factors determining the deviation from this average: a fraction of parental permanent income (␤ Y i,tϪ1 ) and other influences not associated with parental income (ε i,t ). The average income of generations will evolve through time, and it may be that many or all members of a generation will have incomes higher than what their parents had at a similar age in the past. This is captured in equation (1) by the value of ␣. However, and just as importantly, the equation reflects the idea that an individual's income is nonetheless related to his or her parents' income. This is captured by the value of ␤, which represents the fraction of income that is on average transmitted across the generations. In other words, ␤ summarizes in a single number the degree of generational income mobility in a society. It is often referred to as the generational income elasticity, and could conceivably be any real number. A positive value mid-1990s. These fluctuations were the result of a policy that increased immigration during economic booms and reduced it during recessions, with the adjustments often being made by lowering the number of immigrants admitted under the independent immigrant class. This tap-on, tap-off policy was abandoned in the early 1990s, and immigration levels have remained relatively high since.
would indicate generational persistence of incomes in which higher parental income is associated with higher child incomes; a negative number would indicate generational reversal of incomes in which higher parental income is associated with lower child incomes. The theoretical underpinning for this model is often motivated by Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986 ).
An extensive international literature on the degree of generational income and earnings mobility using this framework has developed since the early 1990s, spurred by the availability of sufficiently long panels of data and the publication of Solon (1989 Solon ( , 1992 and Zimmerman (1992) , which highlight the importance of measurement errors and methods to correct for them. Many of these developments and issues are foreshadowed in Atkinson, Maynard, and Trinder (1983) , and extended to include an assessment of the consequences of measuring parent and child outcomes at different points in the life cycle as, for example, in Jenkins (1987) , Grawe (2006) , and Haider and Solon (2006) . Solon (1999) offers an overview of this literature in the context of a coherent analytical framework. D'Addio (2007) and Corak (2006) build upon this to offer a set of internationally comparable estimates of the earnings elasticity between fathers and sons. This set, drawn from Corak (2006) , is presented in table 1. These results are based upon a metaanalysis of published estimates of the intergenerational elasticity between fathers' and sons' earnings, accounting roughly for the fact that published results differ according to the extent that measurement errors are corrected, and the point in the life cycle that parental earnings are obtained. Information on daughters and on other definitions of material resources is starting to become available in the literature but is still not as extensive as the father-son relationship.
There is a good deal of variation across the rich countries in the degree to which paternal earnings advantage is passed on to sons, by at least a factor of two from 20% or less to 40% or more. Further, in no country is the inherited parental advantage much lower than one-fifth. The United States, the United Kingdom, and to a slightly lesser extent France, stand out as being the least mobile societies, with 40% to 50% of fathers' earnings advantage being passed on to sons.
At the other extreme are Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Canada with about 15% to 20% of earnings advantage passed across generations, and in an intermediate position Germany and Sweden with about 30%.
There is little information of this sort directly related to the experience of immigrants. The extent of generational mobility among immigrants may differ from that of nativeborn children for a number of reasons. First, there may be differences in characteristics of immigrant and native-born children that are unobserved to the researcher, yet correlated with parental income. The literature on immigration shows that immigrants may be a selected group along not just their observed but also their unobserved (to the researcher) characteristics, reflecting individual decisions to migrate and the administrative rules used by host countries (Aydemir, 2003) . Selection in unobserved traits such as ability or motivation may make immigrant parents more or less efficient in human capital production of their children and thereby influence their labor market outcomes. Immigrants may also be positively selected if there is a dynastic motive in their migration decision, if they are more concerned about their children's outcomes than the average. To the extent that these unobservables are correlated with income they will influence the estimated value of ␤ in equation (1).
Second, the degree of generational mobility may differ among immigrants because of the role of what some analysts have referred to as "ethnic" or "social" capital. Borjas (1993 Borjas ( , 1994 points out that the estimates of ␤ in equation (1) may be higher for immigrants if the average value of Y i,tϪ1 over the members of the community within which the child grows up plays a more important role in determining longer-run outcomes. The nature and degree of this influence may certainly vary across different immigrant communities, but the presumption in the literature appears to be that on the whole it is more important than for the population at large. Borjas (1992) , for example, offers evidence that this is the case in the United States. 2 Our approach to estimation is most closely related to that of Borjas (1992 Borjas ( , 1993 and particularly Card, DiNardo, and Estes (2000) . Using U.S. data Borjas (1992) finds a significant elasticity between parent and child education among both those born to immigrant parents and those born to 2 Outcomes for second-generation immigrants may also differ from the general population if immigrant parents differ from native-born parents in terms of the observed characteristics. For example, if immigrant parents have lower incomes, then to the degree that generational mobility differs across the income distribution-to the degree, in other words, that the assumption of linearity embodied in equation (1) is in fact not correctthere may be differences in generational mobility between children born to immigrant parents and those of native-born parents. Differences for immigrants may also arise from measurement errors associated with language or culture. If first-generation immigrants face greater or fewer difficulties in the labor market because of say literacy by country of origin, and if these challenges are less important for the second generation, then parental income may be a noisier measure of ability among immigrants than among the population as a whole. This will have the effect of decreasing earnings persistence among immigrants. We thank Nathan Grawe for bringing this possibility to our attention. native-born parents. This relationship is weaker for the former, but he also finds that so-called ethnic capital plays a major role in intergenerational mobility and more so for immigrant children. This suggests that overall mobility among immigrants may be lower. Similarly, Borjas (1993) finds strong intergenerational correlation between earnings of first-and second-generation immigrant men. Card, DiNardo, and Estes (2000) using a similar method find elasticities between the earnings of immigrant fathers and their children which-at 0.5 to 0.6-are about the same or a bit higher as those reported in the existing U.S. research on the entire population. Card, DiNardo, and Estes also find that children of immigrants tend to have noticeably higher education and wages than children whose parents were born in the country. They also suggest that, at least for the more recent cohort they study, this transmission of economic status across the generations works entirely through the impact that the fathers' education has on their children's education and income.
The results of European research vary, though some of the focus is on educational attainment and is informed by more than just the simple regression to the mean model depicted in equation (1). Van Ours and Veenman (2003) study the Netherlands; Hammarstedt and Palme (2006) , Osterberg (2000) , and Rooth and Ekberg (2003) , Sweden; Nielsen et al. (2003) , Denmark; Dustmann and Theodoropoulos (2006), Britain; and Gang and Zimmermann (2000) , Riphahn (2002 Riphahn ( , 2003 , and Fertig and Schmidt (2002) focus on Germany. In some cases, like the Netherlands and Sweden, the educational attainment of second-generation immigrants is lower than children of native-born parents and is related to parental education levels; in other cases, like Denmark, it is lower but not related to parental education. In Germany the research results are mixed. For Sweden Hammarstedt and Palme (2006) find higher intergenerational earnings mobility among natives than among immigrants, but Osterberg (2000) also reports that intergenerational education mobility is higher for immigrant men than for men with a Swedish background, while the opposite is the case for the women. Dustmann and Theodoropoulos (2006) find that the second generation is more highly educated than the first generation of comparable natives, but that this does not translate to superior employment rates or noticeably superior wages. 3 The degree of generational mobility among immigrants has not been studied with Canadian data. Corak and Heisz (1999) , Corak (2001) , Fortin and Lefebvre (1998) , and Grawe (2004a Grawe ( , 2004b present evidence for the general population, but the availability of appropriate data has prevented an analysis focused on immigrants, though Sweetman and Dicks (1999) offer an analysis by ethnicity. Hum and Simpson (2004) note that the wages of secondgeneration children are slightly higher than their native-born counterparts, but with the data available to them are not able to relate this to generational mobility. Our analysis is based upon a new question added to the 2001 Canadian Census referring to the birthplace of the respondent's parents. The Long Form of the Census questionnaire administered to 20% of the population asks, in question 32, all persons age 15 and over in which country their father and mother were born. 4 On this basis the 2001 Census allows the precise identification of immigrants, second-generation immigrants, and others born in Canada (which we refer to as third generation or higher).
This information does not permit a direct link between the adult outcomes of children and the status of their parents when they were raising their families, but it does permit the construction of a grouped data estimator relating the average outcomes of second-generation adults in 2001 with the average background characteristics of immigrant adults from the 1981 Census who were potentially their parents. An analysis of the generational mobility of immigrants using detailed country of origin along these lines is also offered in Borjas (1993) and Card, DiNardo, and Estes (2000) .
We define first-generation immigrants as those who immigrated to Canada regardless of the age of arrival. For the most part we follow Card, DiNardo, and Estes and define second-generation immigrants to be those Canadian-born individuals whose mother and father were both born outside of Canada. 5 More specifically, immigrant fathers are drawn 3 There is only a limited literature, as far as we are aware, of how particular immigrant outcomes differ according to country of origin. Smith (2003) , for example, examines the assimilation of Latino immigrants in the United States, and Borjas (1993) relates the overall intergenerational earnings elasticity among immigrants to the United States to certain characteristics of the host country-size of the immigrant flow, income inequality, and per capita GNP-but Hammarstedt and Palme (2006) appear to be the only study offering intergenerational elasticities by country of origin. Their analysis uses very detailed individual-level Swedish data on virtually all immigrants to the country and on their Swedish-born children. They find considerable variation in the intergenerational earnings elasticity by country of origin, differing by a factor of more than four: from 0.064 for immigrants from the Middle East to 0.27 for those from France (Hammarstedt & Palme, 2006, table 6 ). We know of no similar studies using Canadian data. 4 The exact wording is as follows. Since the variation in the outcome variables may arise from the differences in demographic characteristics between country groups, we construct age-and region-adjusted years of schooling and earnings outcomes for each country group of origin. For the immigrant fathers, we regress the variable of interest (log weekly earnings) on age, age-squared, country of origin dummies, province dummies, and country of origin dummies interacted with age and age-squared. The inclusion of these interaction terms controls for differences in age-earnings profiles across countries. We then calculate predicted schooling or earnings for each source country at age 40 and for residence in Ontario. For the secondgeneration sons and daughters we construct age-and regionadjusted outcomes by regressing schooling or log weekly earnings on age, age-squared, dummies for father's country of origin, and region dummies; and then predicted outcomes for each country group for a 31-year-old living in Ontario. These points in the life cycle correspond roughly to that used in much of the generational earnings mobility literature, and in particular the Canadian studies.
To avoid small sample size problems, we aggregate some countries in which observations were less than thirty into groups and arrive at a total of seventy countries. This is done separately for sons and daughters, and a list of these countries and summary statistics are provided in appendix table 1. These seventy data points are used to estimate equation (1) for sons and daughters using average weekly earnings as the outcome.
This grouped data estimator of equation (1) has both advantages and disadvantages. Some of these are discussed in Card, DiNardo, and Estes (2000) . The most obvious disadvantage includes the potential slippage between the generations. The "parents" are the potential parents of the children, and there could be a slippage in how representative they are of the actual parents due to death or emigration. At the same time, however, it should be noted that the large sample size available to us through the use of the full 20% Census file reduces this problem to the largest extent possible in the literature with which we are familiar. In particular our specifications offer a tighter fit than possible with U.S. data. For example, Card, DiNardo, and Estes (2000) are able to develop a similar structure for only thirty source countries, and the data require them to relate the earnings and education of all immigrants in 1980 to all secondgeneration individuals aged 16 to 65 in 2000.
On the other hand, the advantage of this estimator is that it is more robust to measurement error. This is a particularly important concern in the analysis of the intergenerational transmission of earnings inequality as discussed, for example, in Solon (1992 Solon ( , 1999 . In this literature researchers are faced with the difficulty of having to infer information on permanent income from annual earnings, and trying to minimize a classical errors in variables problem through instrumental variables or through multiyear averages from panel data on individual annual earnings. The use of grouped averages reduces the potential for the attenuation bias that is a potential problem with individual-level data.
Finally, our very large sample size also permits us to minimize the possible consequences of measurement error associated with the calculation of within-cell sample statistics. As discussed in Aydemir and Borjas (2006) , since the within-cell means are based upon calculations that are samples, their accuracy will vary with the number of observations available. The implication is that the sampling variation associated with the independent variable will lead to an attenuation bias. Aydemir and Borjas examine the nature and extent of this bias, and also show that the use of the 20% Census file, as opposed to smaller sampling rates available in public-use versions, affords a sufficiently large sample size to minimize its impact.
III. Descriptive Overview
Since the 2001 Census marks the first time since 1971 that information on parental place of birth is available, we offer a descriptive overview of the Canadian population that places second-generation immigrants in a broader context. Tables 2 and 3 offer information on a number of individual outcomes by parental origin respectively for men and women. The population is classified into three broad groups: (i) Canadian born, by which we mean either those of aboriginal ancestry or those who are third generation or higher Canadians; (ii) immigrants, those born in a country other than Canada; and (iii) second-generation Canadian born, those born in Canada whose parents were born elsewhere. Since there is some suggestion in the literature that long-run integration is related to language acquisition and age at migration, we divide the immigrant population into two groups, those arriving before the age of 12 and those who were 12 or older when they arrived. The former group is likely to have spent some part of their schooling in the Canadian elementary system and are more likely to have at immigration and the second-generation immigrants based on whether one or both parents are foreign born. Borjas (1993) uses the less restrictive definition of second-generation immigrants as those with at least one foreign-born parent. We also restrict the sample to noninstitutional residents aged 16 to 65. Individuals who resided outside the ten provinces and nonpermanent residents are also excluded. Nonpermanent residents refer to persons in Canada on student or employment visas, ministers' permits, or refugee claimants. developed better language skills. Studies have suggested that these are important considerations in understanding fluency in the acquisition of a language, and more generally the integration of immigrants (Cunha & Heckman, 2007; Worswick, 2004) . This could also mean they may not differ in their adult outcomes from children who were actually born in Canada to immigrant parents, the second-generation group. We also categorize second-generation Canadians into three subgroupings according to whether only the father is an immigrant, only the mother, or both parents. The weighted population shares suggest that in 2001 almost 65% of the Canadian population aged 16 to 65 are of aboriginal origin or third generation, in the neighborhood of 20% are immigrants, and about 15% are born in Canada but have at least one parent born in another country. Immigrants and second-generation immigrants form, in other words, a sizable proportion of the Canadian population. At the same time they tend to have more education than their counterparts whose parents were born in the country. 6 Further, those with two immigrant parents are less likely to be married, and if married much more likely than their counterparts to have a spouse who is either an immigrant or also a second-generation Canadian.
Tables 2 and 3 also show that second-generation Canadians are not any more or less likely to receive government income assistance, though they are less likely to receive other support payments linked to the labor market such as unemployment insurance or disability payments. Their home language is also significantly less likely to be one of the official languages. About 78% of second-generation Canadians with both parents born elsewhere speak English or French at home, compared with close to 100% of those with at least one parent born in the country. Even so, at 78% this is more than twice the proportion for those immigrants who came to the country after the age of 12. A further 20% speak an official language at home to some degree, suggesting that language acquisition is not an issue in the adjustment process across the generations. 7 Finally, the occupations of second-generation Canadians are not that different when compared to immigrants, though there is a tendency for a larger fraction to be employed in administration, and a lower fraction in production. When compared with Canadianborn individuals with Canadian-born parents, secondgeneration Canadians with both parents born abroad are noticeably less likely to be working in production, service, and agricultural jobs, and more likely to be employed in managerial, professional, or administrative jobs. 8 Tables 4 and 5 offer more detailed information on labor market outcomes. The labor market engagement of the second-generation group, however defined, is not any different than that for third-or higher-generation Canadians, whether measured by activity during the Census reference week or activity during the year 2000. For women there is in fact a higher likelihood of working in paid employment. Average annual earnings tend to be higher among immigrant and second-generation men, and noticeably more so for women. Second-generation women whose parents were both immigrants earned on average just over $27,000 in 2000 or about $630 per week. In contrast, third-or highergeneration Canadian women made less than $25,000 or about $575 per week. These tables also offer the earnings distribution in quartiles. These suggest that secondgeneration Canadians are more likely to be in the bottom quartile if they have only one parent born outside of Canada, but more likely to be in the top when both parents were born elsewhere. Immigrants who arrived in the country before the age of 12 have a similar distribution.
In sum, while this information is a very broad portrait of a very heterogeneous population, it does not suggest that second-generation immigrants have inferior education and labor market outcomes than other Canadians, indeed just the opposite. Table 6 offers information that is focused on the more finely defined sample of individuals that form the basis for our intergenerational analysis: immigrants in the 1981 Census who had children 5 to 17 years of age, and second-generation immigrants in the 2001 Census who were 25 to 37 years of age. This information is offered by the region in which the parents were born. Generally these outcomes are superior to those of the population with Canadian-born parents. With the exception of those from Southern and Eastern Europe, immigrant fathers had more education and were more likely to have a university degree than Canadian-born fathers in 1981. Their weekly earnings, 6 This is also the case when educational attainment is examined within finer age groupings. For example, among 25-to 34-year-olds, over 44% of second-generation men with both parents born outside of Canada and about 50% of women have 16 or more years of schooling. This is the case for 30% of third-generation or higher men and 35% of women. See Aydemir, Chen, and Corak (2008) . 7 At the same time it might be fair to suggest that language acquisition may not be as large a barrier for first-generation immigrants in Canada than it may be in other countries. Over 70% of the stock of immigrants who came to the country after the age of 12 speak at least some English or French at home, and a large fraction report having English or French as a mother tongue. 8 We examine the occupational distribution in more detail by calculating the congruence index used by Welch (1999) For men, the index is highest for the first-versus second-generation immigrants, and in particular significantly higher than the first-versus third-generation pairing. For women the similarity in occupations is greatest between second and third generations. This said, the increase in the index across the first two columns in the table shows that there is assimilation across the generations for immigrants, with the occupational distribution of second-generation Canadians being more like the third generation than it is for first-generation Canadians.
however, were not on average as great with the clear exception of those from traditional source countries of Canadian immigration. Those from North America, northern Europe, and western Europe earned 14% more than their counterparts with Canadian-born parents; those from other parts of the world-with the possible exception of Africaearned 10% to 16% less. This picture changes somewhat in the second generation. By 2001 those men 25 to 37 years of age who stated that their parents were born outside of Canada had more years of schooling and a greater likelihood of holding a university degree than Canadians of the same age whose parents were born in the country. With the exception of those from the Caribbean, Central and South America, and Oceania they also had higher weekly earnings. The earnings advantage is about 6% with the exception of those with parents from the traditional source countries, where at 14% it is more than twice as great in spite of the fact that their schooling advantage is not as great. A similar picture emerges for the potential daughters, though in this case there is an education and earnings advantage regardless of the origins of the parents. Also, daughters with parents from the nontraditional source countries have a higher earnings advantage, one that for the most part matches or exceeds that of daughters with parents from the traditional sources.
IV. Least Squares Results of the Average Elasticity
Tables 7 and 8 offer a series of estimates of equation (1) using least squares for a number of different sample selection rules, respectively for sons and daughters. The results in the first three rows are all based on samples in which Canadian-born individuals report that both of their parents are born outside of Canada. They differ according to the age of these individuals, and according to the age and family characteristics of their potential fathers who are drawn from the 1981 Census. Our preferred estimates are in row 3, but this entire set of results is intended to illustrate the impact of the potential slippage in associating sons with their fathers by the use of a grouped data estimator, and also to offer a basis for comparison with the U.S. literature.
The first two rows use a sample selection rule as similar as possible to those in Card, DiNardo, and Estes (2000) . This is the broadest possible definition of second-generation immigrants and their potential fathers, using males between 16 and 65 years of age from the two Censuses. The second row differs from the first in that we use the sons' predicted earnings at age 31 as the outcome of interest. This choice makes no difference to the estimated value of ␤, which, focusing for the time being on men, is found to be 0.207. In contrast Card, DiNardo, and Estes (2000, table 6 .7) report an elasticity of 0.44 for fathers in 1940 and sons in 1970, and 0.62 for fathers in 1970 and sons in 1995. As they note, and as suggested in table 1, these are in the range of reported estimates for the general U.S. population. But they are significantly higher than the estimate we obtain using their sample selection rules, though our larger sample size of seventy is more than double their number. 9 A more finely selected sample is used in row 3, with the ages of sons being narrowed to include only 25-to 37-yearolds, and the sample of potential fathers including only immigrants who are in a conjugal relationship with another immigrant and have children 5 to 17 years of age in 1981. This sample is the tightest definition possible that links adult sons with their potential fathers. There will be slippage if some immigrants and their families in the 1981 sample left the country before 2001. This factor aside, the estimate of ␤, at 0.267, suggests that the point estimates from the more 9 Their grouping estimator is based on 34 countries of origin for the 1940-1970 analysis and 33 for the 1970-1995 analysis. broadly defined samples in rows 1 and 2 are an understatement of about one-third. This said, the estimates are within one standard deviation of each other. The only change introduced in row 4 is to broaden the sample of sons to include those with one parent who was born in Canada, more akin to the definition used by Borjas (1993) . The Notes: Earnings are adjusted for age and region as described in the text. The number of observations in all cases is seventy, corresponding to the country of birth of the father. Estimations are based on weighted least squares, with the sum of the number of sons and daughters from each group as the weight. Standard errors are presented in square brackets. All estimates are significant at least at the 5% level.
The sample selection rules in row 1 are similar to those in Card, DiNardo, and Estes (2000) and intended to facilitate a Canada-U.S. comparison. The use of annual earnings as the outcome in row 5 is intended to facilitate comparisons to existing studies of generational mobility among the general Canadian population. Notes: Earnings are adjusted for age and region as described in the text. The number of observations in all cases is seventy, corresponding to the country of birth of the father. Estimations are based on weighted least squares, with the sum of the number of sons and daughters from each group as the weight. Standard errors are presented in square brackets. All estimates are significant at least at the 5% level.
The sample selection rules in row 1 are similar to those in Card, DiNardo, and Estes (2000) and intended to facilitate a Canada-U.S. comparison. The use of annual earnings as the outcome in row 5 is intended to facilitate comparisons to existing studies of generational mobility among the general Canadian population. estimate of the slope falls from 0.267 to 0.224, a difference of less than one standard error.
Finally, row 5 reports the estimation results when the outcome of interest is defined to be the natural logarithm of annual rather than weekly earnings. This is the outcome used in much of the existing Canadian literature on generational earnings mobility, as for example in Corak and Heisz (1999) and Grawe (2004a Grawe ( , 2004b , and as reported in table 1. The resulting estimate at 0.176 is almost exactly in line with these results.
In sum, the major conclusions from this table are (i) that the best estimate of the generational elasticity in father-son weekly earnings is 0.27; (ii) that the generational elasticity among the immigrant population in Canada is no different than for the population at large; and (iii) that this elasticity is lower, possibly about 50% lower, than in the United States. Table 8 offers the least squares results for the fatherdaughter earnings relationship. All of the estimated elasticities are not statistically different from 0, though the point estimates suggest a very weak negative correlation. This is in contrast with both the existing Canadian literature for the population at large and the findings of Card, DiNardo, and Estes (2000) . Two Canadian-based studies examine the generational mobility of daughters, focusing on annual earnings. Fortin and Lefebvre (1998, table 4. 3) use a similar estimator with Census data that is based upon averages of occupational earnings to suggest that in 1994 the father-daughter elasticity is in the neighborhood of 0.22; though one of their estimates is as low as 0.14, it remains statistically significant. Corak (2001, Figures 1 and 2 are scatter plots of the seventy data points and the estimated regression lines from row 3 of tables 7 and 8. The regression line is estimated with weighted least squares. In order to draw further insights we identify any particularly influential data points by successively dropping a single observation from the regression and reestimating equation (1) with the remaining 69 observations. We do this for each observation and obtain 69 separate estimates of ␤, which are plotted in figure 3 for sons and figure 4 for daughters. The results are always within one standard error of the preferred estimates in row 3 of tables 7 and 8 based on all seventy observations. This exercise highlights that sons of fathers from China and the United Kingdom have a noticeable impact on the point estimate, suggesting that they are more mobile than the average. China also stands out in the results for daughters. 10 The opposite is the case for sons with fathers born in Greece. Though these observations stand out in figure 3 , it should once 10 The relative shares of these countries in the entire population also determines the extent of the change in the estimated elasticity. For example, as appendix table 1 illustrates, the United Kingdom has the second-highest number of children in the data and therefore carries a relatively large weight in the weighted regressions. 
Mean log Wage, Immigrant Fathers
Notes: Sample selection rules are those described in row 3 of table 8. The weighted least squares regression line is depicted and has a slope of Ϫ0.048. Dotted lines represent the average log weekly earnings of fathers and daughters. Not all points are labeled. See appendix table A1 for details. An observation for Canadian-born children of Canadian-born fathers is included for reference but not used in the regression. Observation Deleted from the Regression Notes: The graph depicts the estimated weighted least squares elasticity for a series of samples of 69 observations, each of which successively excludes a single observation. The horizontal axis lists the excluded observation. See appendix table A1 for a complete list of the index numbers. Sample selection rules are those described in row 3 of table 7. The slope of weighted least squares regression line using all seventy observations is depicted as the horizontal dashed line at 0.267. again be stressed that the changes are not outside of the range of statistical uncertainty. Accordingly, our major conclusions are unchanged: in the case of the father-son relationship none of these results are outside of the range of existing Canadian research; in the case of the father-daughter relationship none of the results are significantly different from 0; and finally, overall none of the results put the estimate within the range of the U.S. findings. 11 We expand upon these results by taking a small first step in describing the transmission of economic status across the generations. An often-cited transmission mechanism in determining intergenerational mobility is investment in education, and we explore the extent to which these outcomes represent differential access to schooling in the following way. 12 The benefits of education in the labor market are represented as
where 0 is a constant, E i,t represents the number of years of education individual i has obtained, is the rate of return to an extra year, and u i,t represents influences on earnings other than education. Education attainment is assumed to be dependent upon the father's earnings so that
Together these relationships imply that
. This is in the form of equation (1) and
). In other words the estimated magnitude of the generational earnings elasticity can be decomposed into the influence of two components: those having to do with education (the return to education and the influence of parental income on educational attainment), and those having to do with the influence of family background through channels other than education.
The results are presented in table 9. First, the factors driving the overall estimates of the generational elasticity are those running through pathways other than educational attainment. The relationship between father's earnings and son's educational attainment is relatively weak, and the return to education for second-generation men is low. The result is that almost all of the 0.267 estimate for ␤ is related 11 For reference, figures 1 and 2 also include an observation for Canadianborn men and women whose fathers were born in Canada. This observation is not used in the regression. In the case of figure 1 this data point is below the regression line and in the lower right quadrant of all points, indicating that these parents have above-average earnings but that the sons have belowaverage adult outcomes. The earnings of the sons are lower than what their father's income would predict from the relationship for second-generation immigrants. This suggests that children from second-generation families of the same earnings as those from Canadian-born families will on average earn more, or equivalently that children from much lower earnings backgrounds will on average do better or no worse.
12 Similar decompositions are used in Blanden (2005) , Blanden, Gregg, and Machin (2005) , and Ö sterbacka (2004). to other channels. For daughters the return to education is much higher, but access is less influenced by paternal earnings leaving a weak correlation due to education that meshes with a weak negative influence from other familial influences. There are no comparable results along these lines for the Canadian population at large, but Blanden (2005, table 12 ) reports that in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany from one-third to one-half of the estimated generational elasticity is explained by influences associated with educational attainment. Implicitly our results from this decomposition point to the importance of other aspects of family background-unobserved characteristics or other influences on family investment strategies associated with the community, so-called social capital-as playing an important role in determining the degree of generational earnings mobility among Canadian immigrants.
V. Social Capital and Other Influences
In Borjas (1992) the impact of broader influences is explicitly recognized by including the average characteristics of the relevant community in equation (1) so that the estimating equation becomes
where Y tϪ1 represents the average earnings of fathers from the same country. This is a formulation for individual-level data, and implies that our analysis based upon group averages yields an estimate of ␤ ϭ (␤ 1 ϩ ␤ 2 ), making clear that this is potentially one reason why the generational elasticity among immigrants may differ from the general population. However, as Borjas (1992, p. 145 ) also makes clear, the interpretation of this variable as social capital "is not the only one consistent with the data. Such factors as discrimination or lack of access to schools, credit markets, or other institutions can also generate a correlation between the skills of children and the average skills of fathers in the ethnic group." As such it would seem that the focus on average outcomes, as estimated by least squares, mixes up the role of social capital with broader social factors that may also determine how group characteristics are valued by the labor market.
This issue is similar to discussions in the generational earnings mobility literature of interpreting ␤ as an indictor of equality of opportunity. Roemer (1998 Roemer ( , 2004 cautions that estimates of regression to the mean models should not be taken as indicators of equality of opportunity because parents influence their children through a hierarchy of circumstances. Some of these will imply a correlation between earnings across the generations that most in society would agree should not be eliminated. 13 Least squares estimates focus on average outcomes that blend all of these together. Grawe (2004b) argues that this requires an estimation strategy explicitly addressing the extent to which the outcomes of the highest-earning children of low-income families fall short of the highest-earning children from highincome families. These are presumably individuals who make the same type of choices, reflecting similar motivations and preferences. He applies his argument to crosscountry comparisons of the degree of equality of opportunity, and in Grawe (2004a) tests for the presence of financial constraints in determining access to higher education. A similar strategy is also used in Dardanoni et al. (2006) .
We paraphrase this reasoning to apply to immigrants with different kinds or levels of social capital. Figure 1 can be used to illustrate the argument. The scatter plot is also divided into four quadrants according to whether the weekly earnings are above and below the averages for both fathers and sons. Countries in the lower-left quadrant have belowaverage paternal earnings that are related with belowaverage earnings for the sons, and in most cases below what would be predicted by the regression line. Other countries, 13 To paraphrase his research, these circumstances are three in number: (i) through social connections that facilitate access to education and jobs; (ii) through family culture and investments that influence skills, beliefs, and motivation; and (iii) through the genetic transmission of ability. The amount of parental income advantage passed on to children consistent with equality of opportunity is not self-apparent as each of these successively broader fields correspond to a broader definition of equality of opportunity. Roemer makes explicit that equating equality of opportunity with complete generational mobility implies that not only should the influence of social connections and also of family culture and investment be eliminated, but so should the genetic transmission of ability and the influence of family on the formation of preferences and goals among children. He suggests this is "a view that only a fraction of those who consider the issue would, upon reflection, endorse" (Roemer, 2004, p. 49 ). such as those in the upper-left quadrant with roughly similar paternal earnings, are associated with much higher child outcomes, and in some cases significantly above what would be predicted. If the unobserved characteristics or social capital of these two communities differs significantly we would on average expect different earnings outcomes among the children. The family and community resources fostering beliefs and motivation or offering a network facilitating access to schooling or particular jobs in a way valued by the Canadian labor market may be greater in one case than in the other. If so we will expect the children from the relatively advantageous social background to have higher earnings than their counterparts, and to be in the topleft quadrant of figure 1. We might also expect that these children are more likely to face any other barriers or constraints in the way of economic success that might be imposed by society at large. In other words, these broader social constraints-like discrimination, lack of access to schools, and credit markets as mentioned by Borjas-might be more likely to be binding for this group. As such, if a researcher is interested in distinguishing the influence of social capital from the barriers arising from the structures embedded in the education system or the labor market, then the focus should be on a best-case scenario by examining the children who have the most favorable stock of familial and community resources available to them. They are likely to earn more than their counterparts from less advantaged backgrounds, but not as much as they could have earned.
When applying this reasoning to testing the presence of credit constraints in the Becker-Tomes model, Grawe (2004b, pp. 822-823) suggests that quantile regressions offer an appropriate methodological approach. If there is less than full equality of opportunity among certain immigrant groups, it will be identified by a strong generational elasticity among children whose earnings are high conditional on their parent's earnings. These elasticities should be greater than those for children whose outcomes are low conditional on income. Grawe (2004b) hypothesizes that upper quantiles, in other words, should be steeper and be the factor driving the generational elasticity calculated at the average through least squares. 14 We therefore adopt this approach with grouped data in order to begin a more detailed analysis of the least squares results in a way that isolate the role of social capital effects on the outcomes of second-generation children.
Tables 10 and 11 present the results for men and women respectively. The results for the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantiles are offered and, for the sake of reference, the least squares results from row 3 of tables 7 and 8. Results from two models are presented; the first is equation (1) and the second adds an additional covariate, the average number of years of education among fathers, to this equation. This latter formulation is meant to directly account for one measure of potential social capital.
For men the quantile regression results suggest that the least squares estimate is in fact driven by the upper part of the distribution. The generational earnings elasticity is about 0.18 at the 25th and 50th quantiles, though the former is not statistically significant. This rises to 0.27 at the 75th quantile, essentially the same value as the least squares results. Though, as table 7 suggests, the least squares results may be roughly the same as the population as a whole, the pattern in the quantile regression of an increasing elasticity is not. Grawe (2004b, table 4. 3) reports just the opposite tendency. In his sample the elasticity falls from 0.26 at the 25th quantile, to 0.21 at the median, and finally to 0.16 at the 75th quantile.
Our results suggest that sons from low-income immigrant backgrounds poised to be higher-income adults still do not do as well as those from higher-income immigrant backgrounds. Variations in social capital among the immigrant population may limit the degree of generational mobility, but it also has something to do with the influence of broader social institutions. This interaction is mediated by the average education levels of fathers. When this covariate is added to the model the least squares results do not change appreciably, with the generational earnings elasticity rising only slightly to 0.29. However, the quantile regression results change in important ways. The estimates in the second panel of table 10 suggest, firstly, that the generational earnings elasticity is strongly positive at the lower end of the income distribution, flat in the middle, and then turns negative at the top.
The estimated elasticity of 0.605 for the 25th quantile suggests that net of the influence of parental education, children from countries with on average low-income backgrounds who end up on average to have low income as adults are much more disadvantaged than their counterparts from high-income backgrounds. Further, the elasticity of Ϫ0.136 among the most successful children of immigrants suggests there is an intergenerational reversal of earnings, with the children of parents with below-average earnings becoming above-average earners in the next generation. The change in the generational earnings elasticity across the two panels of this table suggests that lower levels of parental education of the low-income countries constrain the outcomes of their most successful sons. It is as if having a more educated parent is necessary to negotiate broader societal hurdles, be they discrimination, access to schools, or credit constraints. We interpret the changes between the two panels as also suggesting that parental education is important in ironing out the disadvantages that relatively less successful sons from low-income backgrounds experience relative to their counterparts from high-income backgrounds. Table 11 presents the findings for women. The slopes of the quantiles are all very flat, though positive at the bottom of the earnings distribution. Only the elasticity at the median is statistically significant from 0, but at Ϫ0.08 it is small in magnitude. However, once paternal years of education are controlled the results for women are in fact similar in kind to those for men: positive at the lower end of the income distribution, flat in the middle, and then negative at the top. The magnitudes are not as strong at the lower end as they are for sons, but stronger at the upper end. For daughters the generational earnings elasticity of Ϫ0.723 suggests a strong intergenerational reversal of earnings across the generations at the higher quantile so that net of the influence of parental education the daughters from low-income backgrounds are the high-income earners of the next generation. Thus, this is the major factor driving the differences between the genders. Father's education is correlated with income and plays a much stronger role in determining daughter outcomes at the top end of the earnings distribution.
Taken together these patterns explain the results for the average derived from least squares, distinguish the role of social capital from other community-level influences, and paint a more nuanced picture of the extent and nature of equality of opportunity among immigrants and their children. The process determining the transmission of family background into adult labor market success is very much mediated by aspects other than income. In particular the average years of parental education among the previous generation plays an important role in determining earnings.
VI. Conclusion
This paper examines the generational earnings mobility of Canadians born to immigrant parents. The labor market assimilation of immigrants has long been a concern of both research and policy, with the declining average earnings in a succession of recent cohorts sparking a number of studies. In this context, however, it is also important to understand the longer-term implications and particularly the potential consequences for the adult labor market success of children. If the degree of generational earnings mobility is high, if in other words a child's adult earnings are only weakly correlated with parental earnings, then it may be that relative disadvantages in childhood will not persist to the same extent in adulthood. Generational mobility is in this sense an important aspect in gauging the labor market integration of immigrants. Notes: Standard errors are presented in square brackets. All quantile regression estimates are significant at the 1% level except the slope estimate for the 25th quantile in models 1 and 2, and that for the 75th quantile in model 1. The former is not statistically different from 0, the latter is at the 10% level. For the quantile regression results R 2 refers to the pseudo R 2 . Sample selection rules are the same as row 3 of table 8 with a total of seventy observations. Our analysis uses new information from the 2001 Canadian Census and established estimation procedures based on grouped averages to examine the strength of the link between the weekly earnings of fathers and their sons and daughters. Second-generation Canadians are a significant proportion of the adult population, with about 15% of Canadians having at least one parent born in another country. A descriptive overview of the population suggests that the education attainments and labor market outcomes of second-generation Canadians are in the least no worse and in many ways better than those whose parents were born in Canada. Second-generation Canadians are less likely to lack high school credentials and more likely to have a university degree; their incidence of reliance on government transfer payments and rates of employment and unemployment are no different; and their average earnings are greater.
We focus our analysis on a group of young adults whose parents were both born in a country outside of Canada and examine the strength of the tie between their earnings from the 2001 Census and the earnings of immigrants in the 1981 Census who are potentially their fathers. Using group averages by country of birth we select a sample that allows an unbiased estimate of the earnings elasticity between fathers and children. On average second-generation children earn more than their parents did at a similar point in the life cycle. At the same time we find a statistically significant elasticity between father and son outcomes suggesting that the son's earnings will be about 2.7% higher for every 10% increase in the father's earnings. This least squares estimate is less than half the value uncovered in comparable U.S. research. When measured in terms of annual earnings we find an intergenerational elasticity of 0.18, a result very similar to the findings for the general Canadian population in the existing literature. The degree of generational earnings mobility between fathers and sons is on average no different among the sons of immigrants to Canada than it is for the population as a whole. Further, by international standards this is a relatively high degree of mobility. We also find that there does not appear to be any statistically significant relationship at all between father and daughter earnings.
Our analysis suggests that the transmission of earnings across generations works only slightly through the impact of paternal earnings on the education attainment of children. There is a strong tie between the paternal earnings and the number of years a son attends school, but the return to education is relatively low so that only about 5% of the 0.27 elasticity is directly due to educational attainment. Other channels between family background and adult earnings are much more important.
Our use of grouped averages abstracts from withincountry variation in outcomes and puts the focus on one often-cited channel: the average characteristics of the community to which the child belongs. We find that a very important dimension of this is the average level of paternal education. More educated communities are able to steer their children through the barriers they may face in broader society in a way that gives them an advantage. By using quantile regressions we find the generational elasticity calculated by least squares for the average is driven by the upper part of the son's earnings distribution. This result is consistent with the idea that broader societal constraintslike discrimination, limits on access to education, and credit market restrictions-limit the earnings prospective of the most successful children from low earnings backgrounds. If average paternal education levels are controlled we find a generational reversal of earnings, with sons from belowaverage backgrounds becoming above-average earners in their adulthood. These results are similar in kind for daughters.
In sum, relative earnings advantages and disadvantages in the first generation of immigration to Canada are only weakly passed on to the second generation, suggesting that in the past there has been a rapid integration of the children of immigrants into the mainstream of the Canadian labor market. To the extent that there is a relationship between the generations, it comes mostly from the fact that the highestachieving sons of low-income immigrants do not earn as much as the highest-achieving sons of high-income immigrants. But it should be stressed that by the very nature of the analysis these results refer to a group of young Canadians whose parents came to Canada before 1980, and who came of age in the context of the education system of the 1980s and the labor market of the 1990s. The extent to which these patterns continue to hold into the future and remain relevant for the children of more recent cohorts of immigrants is an important issue in understanding their prospects. 
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